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Trying Not to Lie…and Failing:  
Autoethnography, Memory, Malleability 
 
John Freeman 
Falmouth University, Penryn, Cornwall, United Kingdom 
 
All research is experiential, whether this is the experience of reading in the 
library or observing in the field. Autoethnographers take experience into 
narratives and are themselves key participants in their research, and often also 
its subject. For autoethnographers the idea of research as a neutral process is 
abandoned in favour of a self-reflective form that explores the researcher's 
perspective on the subject in question. Autoethnography inevitably negotiates 
the relationship between the stories we want to tell and the histories we have 
lived through; between the necessary fictions of publication/presentation and 
the real world experiences we draw upon. This article questions whether we can 
ever tell our experiences truthfully. This article questions what it might mean to 
write oneself into research findings and narrative reports, and it asks what 
happens when one's self goes further and becomes the research. It offers 
perspectives and provocations which are informed but not bound by 
autoethnography's extant body of thought and readers are invited on a brief 
journey through self-writing as it relates to the vagaries of memory and the 
illusion of truth. Keywords: Autoethnography, Self-Deception, Self-Reflection, 
Experiential Research, Memory 
  
 This article casts a wide net and it will range across many fields of practice. In so doing 
paragraphs will turn from the general to the particular and back again in ways that, hopefully 
at least, cut through a surface treatment to the heart and blood of self-writing.  
 In taking writing as a theme the sections that follow will weave form and content in 
ways that are not always quite deliberate and perhaps not always fully under control. For these 
moments to come I can only beg the reader’s forgiveness and hope that the article’s searching 
for answers rather than documenting that which has already been found will read less like 
structural collapse than a genuine and useful attempt at practising a little of the things that 
autoethnographers often preach. 
 If the macro of the article is writing, its micro is research, brought face-to-face in the 
idea of communication that legislates against its own concealment of construction. The 
etymology of obscene is off scene, hidden, out of sight. In most traditional forms of research 
the investigator’s self has likewise been historically hidden, camouflaged in borrowed cloaks 
and behind the representation of other. In a similar way, and with some notable exceptions, the 
writer’s self has traditionally been excised from all but autobiographical publication, limited to 
the idea of observation from a distance; as though this act of disentanglement would somehow 
result in rigour; as though good research could only take place when the researcher stays firmly 
outside the frame. 
 Essentially the researcher’s position has been regarded as not at all interesting; indeed 
convention has preferred the neutrality of the term disinterested. Nor have we generally 
regarded the researcher’s perspective as important, with the main schools of thought being that 
one’s research should echo that of a dispassionate and essentially objective observer, of an 
articulate, trained and intelligent uber-everyman/everywoman grounding findings within a 
coolly coherent body of sustained theoretical prose. 
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 As an alternative to this the autoethnography focused on in this article functions as a 
pedagogic and creative tool for focusing attention on the inevitability and indeed the usefulness 
of subject positions. Its concern is also with acknowledging the inevitable overlaps between 
the maker and the made, and with a hopefully cautious relationship with truth. This caution is 
not something we need take as suspect. On the contrary it stems from recognition that ideas of 
truth are sometimes no more than the opinions that have been spoken by the loudest voices and 
that any truth is a half-truth at best. In this context any and all claims for objective truths that 
creep into the next few pages should be treated with healthy disdain. 
 Alphonse Bertillon wrote that we are only able to see what we observe, and that we 
only observe things which are already in the mind (Bertillon, 1989); whilst in his essay On the 
Decay of the Art of Lying Mark Twain famously told us that everybody lies ... every day, every 
hour, awake, asleep, in his dreams, in his joy, in his mourning. If he keeps his tongue still his 
hands, his feet, his eyes, his attitude will convey deception (Twain, 2015, p. 26). And truth is 
indeed an impossible prey to catch, not just because it is elusive, but because it is different in 
kind to fact.   
 My belief (if such a conceit can have any place in this paper) is that the methodologies 
of memoir, autoethnography and creative non-fiction have become so commonplace in the arts, 
humanities, health, education and social sciences that they are now, in a great many instances, 
little more than mantras, so that in too many authors' and postgraduate students’ hands self-
writing has come to honour no audience greater than itself. That I consider this to be so does 
not make it a fact. 
 If the personal can hold sway as evidence (and this article is all about that very question) 
then I can say that in my professional life I have read (and indeed written) a few too many weak 
autoethnographies to be left with much of the a priori faith in the term that many of my 
genuinely valued colleagues seem to possess. If this results in an article about autoethnography 
that is in part an article for autoethnographers that is also in places an article against 
autoethnography then that confluence should be seen not as cynicism so much as a healthy 
form of skepsis that is desperately seeking conviction. The article’s battle then is with the 
quality of writing in the field rather than with the battleground itself. More than this and 
because quality is almost as hard to define as truth, the battle is with autoethnography and 
memoir as these have become able to play in the hands of the idle. Truth be told these thoughts, 
part-claim and part-disclaimer, part-provocation and part self-protection, will be returned to 
throughout the next few thousand words. Truth be told. If truth on the page can ever be told. 
 The idea of truth in art and literature is a hoary idea, done to near death back to Plato 
and beyond. Nevertheless, both autoethnography and memoir trade on truth so relentlessly that 
it is simply not a theme that is possible to sidestep; indeed, research that is not concerned with 
truthful pursuit of verifiable facts is notoriously hard to justify as research at all. As readers of 
this article will surely well know, feelings segue into findings and emotions can muddy the 
waters of information to the extent that facts become the first casualty of creative research. As 
we also well know, our own part-truths are easier to believe than those of other people: because 
everyone is a liar but us. 
 Picasso told us that art is a lie that tells the truth, and we know that art in its various 
forms has its own covenant with veracity. The words truth and fact are often used 
interchangeably but one can generally say that a fact is easier to define than a truth, inasmuch 
as a fact is something that possesses objective reality. To say that the sun rises in the east is 
regarded as a fact. To say that gravity exists is a fact. To say that a certain person loves coffee 
is at best a truth, because the factual evidence of that individual’s consumption of many cups 
each day is not at all proof of love. Scientific facts may well change from one generation to the 
next as new methods of observation come into use but for the most part it is safe to regard facts 
as assertions that can be made subject to proof. Truth on the other hand is not so easy to pin 
John Freeman                                                                                                                                                       920 
down: a work of creative fiction or a painting can, in the sense Picasso meant, be said to be 
true to life or true to human nature.  
 For a philosopher or a theologian the opposite may be true and facts may be fleeting in 
their temporary specificity whereas truth is something eternal and unchanged, but for most 
purposes a fact is a concrete reality that no amount of reasoning will change, something that 
cannot be logically disputed or rejected. A truth is almost the opposite. The idea that a particular 
god exists will for many people be an absolute truth without ever having come close to being 
an objectively verifiable fact. Writing in the magazine America, Terrance W. Klein likens Mary 
of Nazareth to a great work of art and God as the ultimate artist (Klein, 2012). This is hardly a 
factual statement, despite the author’s obvious sense of his and his own subject’s truth. Just as 
truly a non-Christian might write that they believe neither in God nor the widely accepted story 
of Mary of Nazareth and yet they would not be able to propose their version as being based on 
any facts, not even by calling upon the scientific implausibility of a child being conceived as a 
result of a mother’s union with a God who inseminated her by methods unknown. 
 A non-Christian could not regard their beliefs as being factual despite knowing with the 
same level of certainty that a Christian might have for the opposite view. Many people continue 
to regard creationism as a truth in spite of more hard scientific evidence than one could shake 
a Darwinian stick at. Even for those who do not share the peculiar beliefs of the particularly 
religious, truths matter to us in life at least as much as facts, yet they are essentially fluid, 
malleable and open to endless challenge. 
 Facts are often used to substantiate our assertions on particular truths; just as truths may 
be used to help us better understand particular facts. But to offer a truth as a fact is always 
problematic. It is also one of the great pitfalls of autoethnography. Describing our beliefs as 
truths makes them sound rather grand at the same time as it discourages challenge and when 
we confuse the truth of our memories with the fact of what really occurred we are generally 
heading for trouble. All writing balances on the razor edge of deception and description but 
few forms self-delude better (or worse) than autoethnography. 
 The English language has many words to express the concept of truth: integrity, 
sincerity, authenticity, honesty etc. and wanting them to be a part of our work is no bad thing, 
but the words themselves do nothing to make our content true. In autoethnographical research 
terms they are often no more or less than weasel words, used to create an impression that 
something specific, accurate and meaningful has been written about in words that are equally 
accurate. When Stewart Chaplin wrote “of words that suck the life out of the words next to 
them, just as a weasel sucks the egg and leaves the shell,” (Chaplin, 1900) he might have been 
thinking of the ways that autoethnography and memoir would evolve. Added to all of this is 
the fact (or is it a truth?) that we are living through a time of rapidly increasing technical 
sophistication, to the extent that digital techniques and not least on the internet are generating 
a huge interest in manipulative deception and deceptive manipulation. The art world is already 
well-able to create remarkably convincing images, conjuring the false into seeming reality and 
Baudrillard’s notion of simulacrum has come to haunt representation in more ways than we (if 
not perhaps he) could have ever imagined (Baudrillard, 1994). 
 Just as the term art has grown ever broader in meaning so truth has lost even more 
sense of fixity or permanence. In standard research practice there is no longer the illusion of 
absolute methodological certainty and as Art Bochner describes it there is no “single, 
unchallenged paradigm … for deciding what does and what does not comprise valid, useful 
and significant knowledge” (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 268). 
 Reality television in all its guises generally deploys very little sophistication with which 
to conceal its editorial bias and yet we have become so seduced by the image that we still look 
to buy truth where only lies are up for sale, just as we lap up X-Factor contestants when they 
dedicate trite songs to dead relatives and Masterchef cooks who prepare meals so evocative of 
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their tormented childhoods that they shed crocodile tears into their skillets. The international 
talent show The Voice, which has an overt titular concentration on singing, focuses heavily on 
the narrative behind each contestant’s choice of song and/or reasons for entering the show. 
Vanity and careerism are never given as reasons, but promises made to dead relatives whose 
spirits watch over and inspire the singers like guardian angels, are relentlessly invoked.  
 From chat shows to marketing and from the well-intentioned myth-making of memoir 
to the world of confessional performance (where the larger clue might be in the word 
performance rather than in the claim of confession) we are it would appear hungrier than ever 
for a slice of the real. What is clear too is that this article has already used terms like truth, 
reality, authenticity and genuine without any noticeable sense of discernment. This may be no 
more or less than evidence of my own hazy thinking and lazy writing but it may also be a way 
of collapsing these words into something that is at once manageable and clean. To this end 
readers are asked to go with the flow of an authorial conceit that, in terms of memory re-made, 
sees no easy distinction between a YouTube clip, an autoethnographically written thesis, a 
memoir and a tightly-scripted revelation to a chat show host. The issue is the extent to which 
truth might matter in art and the personal might have currency in research. Each of these ideas 
comes together in autoethnography; and if this does not quite expel my own weasel words it 
does at least expose them to the light. 
 Where photographs were once held to be records of a moment in time and considered 
factual enough to be presented regularly as evidence in legal matters, photographers can now 
manipulate their images to the extent that little that we see can be taken as true. Words are the 
same. Anything that is typed, the manuscript for this article for instance, can be edited by 
someone else to be something that it was not before. In the past, the next edition of a book 
could always be changed but the original was retained for posterity. Any changes to original 
records were generally crude and usually obvious. In the digital world the new edition is the 
edition and distinctions between what was and what is are eroded. It was possible in previous 
times to compare different originals to get to some idea of the truth but it is not easy any more 
to know what to regard as an accurate recording of an instant in time. It is too simple a task to 
digitally manipulate an image to make it seem real, or even more real, after the event. The 
questions asked of truth have been with us forever but they are rendered considerably more 
problematic in the digital age. For sure if there is one universal truth in the twenty first century 
it is that there is too much content and not enough time to consume it; if there is one more it is 
that we can no longer have any trust in the images we see and the words that we read. 
 The Vatican no less is well aware of this and in an ancient institution’s desire to keep 
up with the times Pope Benedict’s pre-retirement 2013 message for the World Communications 
Day was entitled Truth, Proclamation and Authenticity of Life in the Digital Age. In his address 
the pontiff called for a “creative and responsible use of the latest technologies in order to 
communicate the lasting truth of God’s love for the world” (Vatican, 2011). Young people in 
particular, the at-the-time Pope told his followers, are increasingly involved in social networks, 
posing important questions about the authenticity of one’s own being. In the search for sharing 
and finding new friends, the message stresses, there is the challenge to be authentic and faithful 
and not to give in to the illusion of constructing an artificial public profile for oneself. With 
every new medium comes a new disruption to the ways we communicate and the ways we 
receive and it may well be that autoethnography is enjoying the honeymoon period that it is 
precisely because we crave so much the truth we know in our heart of hearts we cannot really 
find. 
 Matters of fact and even truth have been replaced with matters of signification and in 
almost everything we see truth has become no more than a copy of truth. Little wonder then 
that autoethnography and memoir, with their blend of sincerity and deception that can at times 
amount to one hand swearing on a bible and one set of fingers crossed behind the back are in 
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danger of becoming the two last turkeys in the shop of the real. What has changed for all of us 
has been the huge rise of digital socialisation and the endless array of electronic outlets to 
express anyone and everyone’s versions of the truth. This zeitgeist of the digital world has 
dramatically influenced the negotiability of truth in all arenas because it has democratised 
global communications in the ways that it has and the ways that it does. So-called citizen 
journalists, bloggers who see themselves as playing active and vital roles in the process of 
collecting and disseminating news and information now participate actively in content 
formation in ways that shape the public narrative on issues ranging from celebrity deaths and 
a country’s reasons for going to war to local authority lawsuits and innuendo dressed up as 
reportage. Regardless of the subject matter, the underlying facts (a weasel word in this context) 
are negotiated and debated by a newly empowered social media: one that is unbound by the 
rules governing lawyers and traditional journalists. 
 Whilst distinctions between bloggers and autoethnographers abound, there are overlaps 
in terms of the currency of independence. We see this in the blogger’s freedom from the dictates 
of media moguls and politically prejudicial editors just as it exists in the autoethnographer’s 
faith in intelligently framed lived experience. But who monitors the individual’s bias?  We are 
none of us independent and free will has been shown on countless occasions to be something 
of a myth. 
 In 1966 the psychiatrist, Charles Hofling arranged for 22 nurses working in a large 
hospital to receive separate telephone calls from an actor who identified himself as Dr. Smith. 
The assumed doctor told each of the nurses that they were to give a 20mg dose of a highly toxic 
drug called Astroten to a specific patient. The actor posing as Dr. Smith (and there was no Dr. 
Smith at the hospital) told the nurses that he was en route to the hospital and that he would sign 
the necessary paperwork as soon as he arrived. The drug was an invention of the experimenters. 
It had been placed in the drug cabinet several days before the bogus telephone calls, marked 
with a prominent warning which reminded staff that 10mg was the maximum safe dose and 
that more than this was potentially lethal. Hospital protocol was categorical that no drug should 
ever be administered based solely on a phone call, yet 21 out of the 22 nurses were about to 
deliver the 20mg dose when they were stopped (Hofling, 1996). 
 The nurses had bowed to the imagined authority of the doctor and were in the process 
of killing patients. Not much evidence of free will there, and what would make us think that 
our minds are more our own than those of the duped nurses? The last half century’s research 
into human behaviour suggests that we are no more than puppets dancing on society’s strings. 
In a very real sense we can never be sure of ourselves and those of us who think we are free 
are perhaps doubly deluded. 
 Contemporary life is sympathetic to the idea, beautiful in its appeal, that each of us is a 
story waiting to be written and that these stories once written will result in a person explained. 
Perhaps we are all stories waiting to be written and perhaps we each have our stories to tell? 
Proponents might well (and doubtless will) argue that autoethnographical research outcomes 
are prime cultural agents in the interrogation and dissolution of assumed binaries between the 
watcher and the watched and the maker and the made. And on some occasions these arguments 
will be sound. At other times, such as when Norman Denzin refers to (presumably all) 
autoethnographers as public intellectuals who produce and engage in meaningful cultural 
criticism and autoethnography itself as providing “a framework against which all other forms 
of writing about the politics of the popular under the regimes of global capitalism are judged” 
(Denzin, 2005, p. 259) or when Andrew Sparkes suggests that autoethnography is superior to 
the “standard boring writing of the academy” (Sparkes, 2007, p. 541) the hyperbole clearly 
exceeds the facts.  
 As Robert Frost told us, if there is no surprise for the writer then there will be no surprise 
for the reader (Steele, 2008, p. 19).  The writing thus changes the writer as much perhaps or 
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even more than the reader. This was certainly the case for Michel Foucault who stated “I write 
in order to change myself and in order not to think the same things as before” (Foucault, 2000, 
pp. 239-240). Objectivity does not necessarily get lost in this mix but it does disguise itself 
sometimes in subjective language, just as subjectivity often hides behind the refusal to use the 
personal pronoun. All of this makes defining an article as an act of research (rather than as an 
article that is just about research) problematic. Perhaps these words of caution are a type of 
self-acknowledgment, a statement of how awkwardly this article and writer will present their 
own acts of autoethnography.  
 It is clear at the outset that any easy distinction in these pages between writing about 
autoethnography and writing that is autoethnographic would be an impossible aim; even if this 
were this article’s intent. It is a positive feature of our times that academic and creative writing 
are no longer seen as oppositional factions, just as autobiography and fiction are fruit from the 
same poisoned tree: poisoned because the act of writing is nothing if not the pursuit of 
persuasion; nothing if not the manipulation of words to serve their own intent. 
 We know that whereas mainstream research was at one time, and for many still is, 
informed by critical perspectives born out of the literary canon, contemporary research in the 
arts, humanities and social sciences is now largely informed by a swathe of post-structural 
theories. The autoethnography focused on in this article is informed by a loose application of 
these theoretical interventions each of which posits self-reality as no more than a composite of 
historically situated language constructs within which our individual or subjective perspectives 
are programmed to play their part. We witness this on a regular basis with autoethnographic 
practitioners whose work conforms to post-structuralist ideals by presenting material that 
acknowledges and investigates the relationships between subjective perspectives and the 
social-historical manifestations of construction.  
 At its best this makes for powerful work; at its worst it creates a cycle of what is often 
little more than the language of oppression, obscured by the babble of hypersubjectivity; or as 
Noam Chomsky sees it, as hypersubjectivity as a form that seeks to deprive the working classes 
of the tools of emancipation, playing working people and vulnerable, excluded communities 
against each other through claims that all projects of enlightenment are redundant in so far as 
inequity is never anything more than one illusion in a world of simulacrum (Chomsky, 1993). 
Foucault’s observations that truth is an effect of power  have created telling critiques on notions 
of objectivity, but where oppression is a fact of daily life placing inverted commas around the 
word truth adds casual intellectual insult to savage social injury. 
 Partly because of Foucault we can say that we are at a point in history where much that 
might once have been edited out of academic writing is now likely to be edited, and 
autoethnography is evidence and application of this. For one of autoethnography’s long-time 
champions, Carolyn Ellis, this inclusivity goes so far as advocating research which is likely to 
“start with my personal life. I pay attention to my physical feelings, thoughts and emotions ... 
to try and understand an experience I’ve lived through” (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 737). We 
are told that his excavation and exploration of self takes its toll: Ellis elaborates: 
 
… honest autoethnographic exploration generates a lot of fears and doubts – 
and emotional pain. Just when you can’t stand the pain anymore, well that’s 
when the real work has only begun. Then there’s the vulnerability of revealing 
yourself, not being able to take back what you have written or having any 
control over how readers interpret it. (Ibid, p. 738) 
 
Ruth Behar adopts a similar line when she writes that autoethnographers need to learn to be 
comfortable with their own passionate vulnerability, knowing that their writings will be 
published in hostile and unforgiving environments (Behar, 1996, pp. 13-14). Speaking perhaps 
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to those same hostilities Kathryn Church is emphatic in her belief that foregrounding one’s 
own voice in research “is not narcissism; it is not an egocentric indulgence” (Sparkes, 2002, p. 
216). Church’s argument is that her subjectivity is filled with the voices of other people and 
that writing about the self is a way of writing about those others and about the worlds which 
she both creates and inhabits. If these are reasonably standard claims for autoethnography then 
they also comprise its standard defence. The notion of autoethnography is regarded with some 
degree of suspicion by university colleagues - and not only those in the hard sciences - and the 
risk of confusing self-indulgence with self-knowing is as potent as it is seductive. If we 
acknowledge Primo Levi’s writing of “the need to tell our story to the rest,” of achieving “an 
interior liberation,” (Levi, 1997, p. 15) we should also heed Charles Marowitz’s dismissal of 
those who write about their own practice as masturbators; (Marowitz, 1991) an idea echoed in 
Blake Morrison’s belief that confessional writing without some sort of tempering judgement is 
little more than masturbation in print. (Morrison) Autoethnograpers, memoirists and followers 
of Levi beware. 
 Autoethnography’s fusing of the self and the social, in Deborah Reed-Danahay’s terms, 
famously locates the self as innately ethnographic rather than touristic (Reed-Danahay, 1997). 
This is a shift from Karl Heider’s view of self, which referred solely, in the autoethnographic 
terms he introduced, to the self of the informant (Heider, 1975). Autoethnography is more 
commonly regarded now as a form of autobiographical ethnography in which researchers are 
able to insert all of the variants of their personal experiences into their investigation and 
documentation; which is to say that the feelings of the researcher, or the researcher’s emotional 
journey, is generally accepted as being grist to the mill of research activity and that which was 
once thought of as spoiling the research is now seen as going no small way towards creating it. 
Carolyn Ellis, Tony Adams and Art Bochner see in this recognition of “the innumerable ways 
personal experience influences the research process” (Ellis et al., 2010). 
 Ellis, Adams, and Bochner suggest that “autoethnographers vary in their emphasis on 
the research process (graphy), on culture (ethno), and on self (auto),” (Ibid) all of which is true 
and when each of these elements is given due time, space and attention autoethnography can 
achieve excellent results. The methodology is prone to suffer however when healthy emphasis 
leads to gross imbalance and research focuses too strongly on the auto. Locating oneself as part 
of an investigated community can understandably lead to insights that are likely to have 
external value in research terms. Locating one’s self as the sole object of investigation, framed 
but not significantly informed by the society one belongs to is likely to lead to some quite 
reasonable allegations of navel-gazing; and this book would be doing its readers a disservice 
by sidestepping these problems rather than engaging with them. At times this engagement with 
criticisms of autoethnography and memoir will go so far as agreement. Despite believing that 
counter-narratives deserve to be heard no less than the grand narratives of modernism, despite 
knowing that injustice goes hand in glove with silence and despite being aware that 
autoethnography is at core anti-hierarchical and subversive it is hard for me to find much 
immediate argument with Jill Taft-Kaufman’s view that: 
 
Despite claims that autoethnography is a mode open to all, certain narratives are 
discouraged (discourse that echoes those dead white males, for example), and 
other stories are favored (especially from voices considered marginalized). 
Autoethnography is touted as a practice that does not participate in the 
perpetration of ideology (advocacy and responsibility are two of those thorny 
issues). However, many of the autoethnographies that appear in journals and at 
academic gatherings explicitly structure and relate the points in their stories to 
the doctrines that underlie the practice, imparting an almost formulaic sameness 
to these supposedly subjective expressions. (Taft-Kaufman, 2000, n.p.) 
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It is probably fair to say that whilst not all research endeavours are autobiographic in flavour 
or intent many are driven by a strong sense of self. In choosing to investigate certain things in 
certain ways we make overt our interests, passions, compassions and fears to others, probably 
more cleanly than we will show them to ourselves. In acknowledging its emphasis on self, 
autoethnography functions as a way of controlling self-interests through their exposure; putting 
a positive spin on this it follows that autoethnography is not so much the ipso facto method 
towards self-indulgence that its critics often claim as it is a methodology that places the 
researcher’s self-motivations front and centre, bringing to the fore that which other approaches 
adopt and also conceal. Taking a more cautious tone we should note and remember that in the 
case of autoethnography methodology is often replaced by mantra. 
 Because we do not often engage in deliberate, conscientious and self-conscious 
reflection upon our own processes of experience we do not generally privilege the personal as 
a form of evidence. Nevertheless Kristi Gerding Scholten suggests that our acts of 
communication will always already embody projections of the self, even if at a subconscious 
level, so that we are presenting and/or performing versions of our selves each time we speak 
or write (Scholten, 2007). For autoethnographers this type of self-reflection and self-projection 
can be described as a harrowing process but one which leads to identification and learning from 
experience. Instead of concealing personal experience, because it is resistant to notions of 
rational argument and systematic results, ideas are articulated through one’s experience, 
leading to a form of communication that is offered up as being at once heartfelt, honest and 
authentic. Rather than assuming a sense of borrowed objectivity, which is often no more than 
the language of objectivity, autoethnography asks whether we are doing ourselves an injustice 
by not examining the way we write ourselves and our readers into our research findings and 
outcomes. 
 How much truth is too much truth? Maybe all truth is good but not all truth is good to 
tell. Like many before me and despite the hard-line ethical fundamentalism of scholars such as 
Martin Tolich (2010). I write this article with knowingly partial truths, leaving out much of 
that which autoethnography so plainly allows. And I do so for two simple reasons: because in 
research, as in writing and as in reading not everything matters equally; and because whilst this 
is an article about autoethnography and memoir it makes no claims for full autobiographical 
disclosure on my own part, whether real or seeming. That said the issues facing me here are 
not radically different to those facing de facto autoethnographers and indeed because in other 
contexts my work has been knowingly autoethnographic it may well be the case that whilst this 
badge has been partly removed from my lapel during the writing of this article some of those 
instincts remain. 
 Certainly I am aware that at least some of my observations and opinions (insights feels 
like too grandiose a term) will be as likely to caution aspirant autoethnographers against their 
form as to inspire them and that I will seek to persuade readers through the structure of 
paragraphs, sentences and chapters as much as through any claims to impartiality, objectivity 
and those traditional staples of academic work. Certainly I am aware that no clean line exists 
between who we are and what we write and that no clear boundary separates the researcher 
from the researched; I am aware too that in my use of the personal pronoun I am invoking 
Romy Clark and Roz Ivanič's elegant arguments about the political conventions of self and that 
in referring to their work as elegant I am adding nuance to fact (Clark & Ivanič, 1997). And 
isn’t that what writing always does? And isn’t that what makes our occasional distrust of claims 
for writerly truth so compelling? Because we know that writing changes everything; just as we 
know that the self both is and is not a fiction; that despite a writer’s best claims to authenticity 
there is never anything authentic in the words we read. Certainly I am aware too, after Roland 
Barthes at least, that whilst autoethnography’s implicit and often explicit claim is that this is 
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just me writing my story within the particular complexities of my life, the subject who writes 
today is never and can never be the same subject who acted yesterday; and we do not need to 
locate ourselves as disciples of French post-structuralism in order to know this. 
 Like reading, writing is never even remotely free from discourse and my own words 
that make up this book are far from innocent. Edward Said would see this complexity as 
worldly, as being in and of the world rather than being particularly sophisticated. The ways in 
which we write are rooted as deeply in the things we have read as in the things we think and if 
when we write we locate ourselves within a huge conversation with everyone else who has ever 
written we are also engaging in the construction of the ways in which we are asking to be seen. 
This is the love-me which Barthes sees as being present within all writing and which brings 
into the light the vanities we attempt so redundantly to conceal behind academic terminology; 
behind a tone of disinterest that amounts to hope disguised as an attitude that asks, and often 
pleads “Am I knowledgeable enough for you?” (Barthes, 1989, pp. 40-41). When taken to 
extremes the values and practices of academic writing, those values of rigour and complexity, 
nuance, accuracy and argument, awareness of the field and the right type of name-dropping 
can make disciplines accessible to only small groups of specialised readers.  
 In her book Stylish Academic Writing Helen Sword analysed 1,000 scholarly articles 
from a wide array of disciplines before coming up with some tactics used by those writers she 
regarded as stylish academics. Sword’s argument is that stylish writers aim to tell compelling 
stories, avoid jargon, provide readers with aesthetic and intellectual pleasure and write with 
originality, imagination, and creative flair. In her survey of stylish writing Sword noticed 
extensive use of first-person anecdotes, catchy openings, concrete nouns, active verbs, the use 
of apposite and illustrative examples, references that show broad reading beyond subject-
specialism and a prevailing sense of humour (Sword, 2012). In a similar vein William Zinsser 
cites warmth and humanity as important parts of nonfiction writing (Zinsser, 2001). All of 
which is good news for autoethnographers and memoirists who know instinctively that every 
research outcome tells a story and that a story without reader-engagement is no story at all. 
 Understanding is about knowing what to do next, whilst skill is demonstrated through 
knowing how to do it. As my own writing no doubt demonstrates, understanding Sword's and 
particularly Zinsser’s words and valuing their views does not automatically mean that we have 
the skills to develop their advice in and through our own practice; but, as Elmore Leonard is to 
novelists and David Mamet is to dramatists, autoethnograpers and academic writers have our 
own best guides. 
 Writing is directed to a certain end and inasmuch as we attempt to articulate our views 
in a language that will be deemed acceptable by the readers we desire we exercise a relatively 
controlled discourse, even when we pay homage to our readers’ abilities to write their own 
meanings into our words. Writing is the negotiation of controlled intent amid the knowledge 
that readers will always go their own sweet way and that all our attempts to seduce and coerce, 
educate and fool are subject to the very same readerly interference that we also might 
champion. All of which is to say that awareness of this is what helps us to distinguish writing 
from typing. 
 We cannot imagine that which we cannot first remember and all memory is an act of 
imagination and ergo of invention. Words can do many things and within the pages of this 
article notions of ineffability have been given no line space, but we know that words can only 
do their best and that even the best words fail to accurately record experience. In failing as 
accurate records words can occasionally do much more than this. Perhaps the finest six-word 
example in English remains Ernest Hemingway’s extraordinary idea for a story:  For sale: 
baby shoes, never worn. That Hemingway considered this to be his finest work makes absolute 
sense. Like much that is great in art these words achieve maximum impact from minimal 
means. They paint a picture and that picture invokes a truth rather than trying to reproduce one. 
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It is important to remember how this relates to autoethnography and memoir, for we know that 
truth is a slippery concept and for those of us who cannot write like Hemingway or paint like 
Picasso our attempts run the risk of reducing the truth of experience to something both literary 
and banal rather than channelling it into something purposive. Questions of truth go hand in 
hand with authenticity: another word that is often glued to autothenography and memoir 
without much regard for why. The question of what it means to write with authenticity should 
be laced through every autoethnographical text. 
 Like Kristina Medford I know that the difference between truth and truthfulness is 
considerably less evasive than the difference between truth and fiction, (Medford, 2006, p. 853) 
just as I know that writing an objective account of reality is not remotely possible, and that 
written text can be a lazy machine for dissemination (Eco, 1994, p. 49). I know too that the 
charges of self-indulgence that have been brought against autoethnography stem from critiques 
of self-showing over self-knowing and that the type of solipsism that offers the argument 
(whether hidden or overt) that there could be no thoughts, experiences, and emotions other than 
the thinker’s own marks much of the egocentricity of the autoethnographer. In its diluted form 
solipsism is a fact of life inasmuch as one can never know other minds in the way that we know 
our own; and knowledge of other minds exists on the basis of certain inferences that we make 
from what evidence of external behaviour is directly accessible to us. 
 In John Locke’s view all that we can know directly is the existence and contents of our 
own minds and all insights into other people’s thoughts are indirect and analogical, inferences 
from our own deeply held perspectives (Locke & Sigmund, 2005). But if autoethnography is 
to function as more than a diary of the given writer’s thoughts and if autoethnographic research 
is to have any purposive validity then a frame of critical thinking and external views is 
inevitable. Contextualising our experiences is no guarantee of truth and it does little to temper 
our writerly self-delusions, but it does provide some small guard against solipsism and the 
tendency to let the auto ride roughshod over ethnography. 
Leon Anderson’s work on analytical autoetnography is useful here (Anderson, 2006). 
Anderson stresses the notion that analytical autoethnography is resistant to the position 
undertaken by the type of evocative autoethnographers this paper has focused on. Where in 
evocative autoethnography the writer/researcher functions as the prime, and often sole source 
of information, analytical autoethnography demands a dialogue with information that goes 
beyond the writer’s self and self-experience. Anderson is emphatic on this point: “...solipsism 
and author saturation in autoethnographic texts…stem from failure to adequately engage with 
others in the field. No ethnographic work, not even autoethnography, is a warrant to generalize 
from an N of one” (Ibid, p. 386). If analytical autoethnography has a commitment to an analytic 
agenda, it is one that is no less social, political and personal; the shift occurs in the way that 
personal experience is framed. Where Denzin is proud to write that evocative autoethnography 
invokes “an epistemology of emotion, moving the reader to feel the feelings of the other” 
(Denzin, 1997, p. 228) and thereby creating texts that refuse to “abstract and explain” (Ibid) 
analytical autoethnography refuses to use the self as the only locus of information. The writer 
is still situated as both subject and object of the text, but that same text offers itself up in the 
hope of creating a dialogue and discourse with a more substantial macro narrative. If this allows 
multiple and hitherto untold stories to be accessed it also validates those narratives as 
conceptually and critically framed by experiences that exist beyond the writer’s own. 
 Abstraction, explanation and analysis are not the autoethnographer’s enemy. Neither is 
truth automatically the autoethnographer’s friend. Like art, autoethnography does not always 
do as it is expected to do; if claims for truth are no more than our sweetest deception then 
perhaps the best we can do is to lace our claims with caution and locate our cautions within 
frames that are as analytically sound as they are evocatively rich. 
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